Exclusionary Zoning: A Project for the California Environmental Quality Act by Ichine, Arlene
Santa Clara Law Review
Volume 19 | Number 3 Article 10
1-1-1979
Exclusionary Zoning: A Project for the California
Environmental Quality Act
Arlene Ichine
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Law Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Santa Clara Law Review by an authorized administrator of Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
sculawlibrarian@gmail.com.
Recommended Citation
Arlene Ichine, Comment, Exclusionary Zoning: A Project for the California Environmental Quality Act, 19 Santa Clara L. Rev. 777
(1979).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/lawreview/vol19/iss3/10
EXCLUSIONARY ZONING: A PROJECT FOR THE
CALIFORNIA ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY ACT?
INTRODUCTION
The police power is not confined to elimination of filth,
stench, and unhealthy places. It is ample to lay out zones
where family values, youth values and the blessings of
quiet seclusion and clean air make the area a sanctuary for
people.'
The traditional concept of zoning involves the valid exer-
cise of the police power to promote the general welfare of a
municipality.2 Popularized in the 1920's, it became a valuable
tool to protect surburban communities from impending urbani-
zation.' Municipalities continue to exercise their zoning power
to preserve rural settings4 or to maintain the social homogene-
ity of a neighborhood. This exercise remains largely a munici-
pal function.
California, however, has enacted a statutory scheme that
requires that every city adopt a general plan' with which zoning
decisions must conform.7 The state law establishes mandatory
elements of these general plans.' One such required element is
a housing element which "make[s] adequate provision for the
© 1979 by Arlene Ichien.
1. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1973).
2. See Comment, The General Public Interest vs. The Presumption of Zoning
Ordinance Validity: A Debatable Question, 50 J. Uaa. L. 129 (1972). See generally 1
A. RATHKOPF, THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING §§ 1.01-.04 (4th ed. 1975) [hereinafter
cited as 1 A. RATHKOPF].
3. See Yannacone & Rakenkamp, Impact Zoning: Alternative to Exclusion in the
Suburbs, 8 URB. LAW. 417, 430-31 (1976); see generally 1 A. RATHKOPF, supra note 2, §
1.02, at 1-13-1-15.
4. See, e.g., Ybarra v. Town of Los Altos Hills, 503 F.2d 250 (9th Cir. 1974).
5. See, e.g., Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp.,
429 U.S. 252 (1977); Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1973).
6. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65300 (West 1966); id. § 65700 (West Supp. 1978). The
general plan is to serve "as a pattern and guide for the orderly physical growth and
development" of land within municipal borders. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 65400(a) (WestSupp. 1978). The general plan "is, in short, a constitution for all future developments
within the city." O'Loane v. O'Rourke, 231 Cal. App. 2d 774, 782, 42 Cal. Rptr. 283,
288 (1965).
7. "County or city zoning ordinances shall be consistent with the general plan
of the county or city by January 1, 1974." CAL. Gov'T CODE § 65860(a) (West Supp.
1978).
8. These requirements include a land-use element, an open-space element, a
noise element, and a safety element for protection from fires and geologic hazards. See
CAL. Gov'T CODE § 65302 (West Supp. 1978).
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housing needs of all economic segments of the community."'
It is clear that zoning that has the effect of excluding low-
moderate cost housing from a community is not within the
intent of the state planning and zoning requirements. Never-
theless, municipalities engage in exclusionary zoning'0 and
view it as a matter of municipal rather than state concern."
The traditional view that zoning is a municipal affair, not sub-
ject to the general laws of the state, remains firmly embedded
in the political philosophies of charter cities." The municipal-
ity continues to be "the repository of the general welfare,"'' 3 and
exclusionary zoning which tends to exclude low-moderate cost
housing remains a viable alternative to California cities."
The California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA)' also
includes zoning and planning within its scope.'" In the context
of environmental quality, an exclusionary zoning ordinance
takes on added controversy. Such an ordinance has often been
designed to protect the environment," and yet it may have
impact on population density outside an enacting city or a
significant effect on resource allocation in the regional area.'"
9. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 65302(c) (West Supp. 1978).
10. The term "exclusionary zoning" as used in this comment refers to land-use
controls imposed through ordinances that directly or indirectly bar low-moderate cost
housing in a community. Such exclusion occurs, for example, through minimum floor
space requirements for residences, restrictions on the number of bedrooms per resi-
dence, or an outright ban on multiple dwellings. See Williams & Norman,
Exclusionary Land Use Controls: The Case of North-Eastern New Jersey, 22 SYRACUSE
L. REV. 475 (1971).
11. See generally Sussna, Remedying Exclusionary Zoning Practices in
Suburbia, 28 U. FLA. L. Rav. 671 (1976).
12. Charter cites in California are incorporated under art. XI, § 3 of the
California Constitution. They are fairly autonomous with respect to municipal affairs.
General law cities, in contrast, are incorporated under the general laws adopted by the
legislature. For a description of the municipal affairs doctrine, see text accompanying
notes 43-48 infra.
13. Comment, So You Want to Move to the Suburbs: Policy Formulation and
the Constitutionality of Municipal Growth-Restricting Plans, 3 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
803, 812 (1976).
14. See, e.g., Ybarra v. Town of Los Altos Hills, 503 F.2d 250 (9th Cir. 1974);
Southern Alameda Spanish Speaking Organization v. City of Union City, 424 F.2d 291
(9th Cir. 1970); Confederacion de la Raza Unida v. City of Morgan Hill, 324 F. Supp.
895 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
15. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 21000-21176 (West 1977 & Supp. 1978).
16. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21080 (West Supp. 1978). For a discussion df CEQA
as a comprehensive planning tool, see Comment, Aftermath: Friends of Mammoth and
the Amended California Environmental Quality Act, 3 ECOLOGY L.Q. 349, 381-89
(1973).
17. See 1 A. RATHKOPF, supra note 2, §§ 7.01-.02, for discussion of wetlands
zoning and flood plains zoning.
18. See, e.g., National Land & Investment Co. v. Kohn, 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d
597 (1965).
EXCLUSIONARY ZONING
CEQA requires that an Environmental Impact Report (EIR) be
filed if a project has the potential to cause a significant effect
on the environment." Included within CEQA's meaning of
"project" is the "enactment and amendment of zoning ordi-
nances ... ."20
This comment will examine whether the enforcement of
exclusionary zoning ordinances constitutes a "project" subject
to the EIR requirements of CEQA. Before concluding that an
exclusionary zoning ordinance is such a project, the comment
will first briefly discuss the general background of the zoning
power, highlighting the derivation of it and the general welfare
concept which serves to legitimize it. Secondly, a discussion of
the municipal affairs doctrine will show why exclusionary zon-
ing should not be considered strictly a municipal affair. Fi-
nally, the comment will explain why exclusionary zoning is a
project that should require an EIR and what the legal signifi-
cance of this requirement would be. The discussion will draw
on California case law to interpret CEQA requirements as well
as to show the state's general judicial disposition toward exclu-
sionary zoning.
ZONING FOR THE GENERAL WELFARE
The municipal zoning power is considered a valid exercise
of the police power.2' The power to zone is delegated to cities
through the state's enabling legislation.22 The city, in exercis-
19. See CAL. Pus. RES. CODE § 21061 (West 1977).
20. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21080 (West Supp. 1978).
21. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926); Miller v.
Board of Public Works, 195 Cal. 477, 234 P. 381 (1925) (established validity of zoning
in California).
22. See 1 A. RATHKOPF, supra note 2, § 1.02[1]. In California there is debate
about whether local government zoning power for charter cities is derived from the
constitution or from enabling legislation. Former art. XI, § 6 of the state con-
stitution authorized charter cities "to make and enforce all laws and regulations
in respect to municipal affairs. . . and in respect to other matters they shall be subject
to and controlled by general laws." CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 6 (1914) (repealed 1970).
This language has been interpreted as delegating police power to a charter city to act
on any matter that is a municipal affair. If this interpretation is correct, then CAL.
Gov'T CODE § 65800 would appear to indicate that the state legislative intent was not
to preempt local governments with respect to zoning. Section 65800 provides in part:
"[T]he Legislature declares that in enacting this chapter it is its intention to provide
only a minimum of limitation in order that counties and cities may exercise the maxi-
mum degree of control over local zoning matters." CAL. Gov'T CODE § 65800 (West
Supp. 1978). For a more thorough discussion, see Comment, Land-Use Control, Exter-
nalities, and the Municipal Affairs Doctrine: A Border Conflict, 8 Loy. L.A. L. REV.
1979]
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ing its power through its local zoning authority, acts as a dele-
gate of the state's power. In that position, it is required to zone
for the general welfare and to assure equal protection of the
laws.21
Initially, municipal zoning was associated with the prohi-
bition of nuisances and hazardous activity .2 In the landmark
case of Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Company," the
United States Supreme Court for the first time reviewed the
validity of zoning pursuant to a comprehensive plan. The Court
upheld the right of a city to enact such a plan by restricting
uses in designated districts. 6 In addition, the Court held that
it was a valid exercise of the police power to exclude uses even
though they were not nuisances or hazardous activity.27 The
Court declared that before a zoning ordinance can be invalida-
ted, "it must be said . . . that [its] provisions are clearly
arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to
the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare.
28
California cases have confirmed the validity of zoning as
an exercise of the police power if it bears a "reasonable relation
to the public welfare. ' 2 Moreover, state courts have consis-
tently held that a zoning ordinance carries the presumption of
validity, 0 explaining the theory in the following manner:
The courts may differ with the zoning authorities as to the
"necessity or propriety of an enactment," but so long as it
remains a "question upon which reasonable minds might
432, 444-47 (1975) [hereinafter cited as The Municipal Affairs Doctrine]. See also
Clark & Grable, Growth Control in California, 5 PAC. L.J. 570, 587-88 (1974).
23. See generally 1 A. RATHKOPF, supra note 2, § 4.02.
24. Thus, the choking off of light and air, the danger of fire, to-
gether with congestion, noise, traffic, dust, fumes, smoke, soot, the
spread of contagious disease, and the attraction of rodents and insects are
well-recognized evils which the cases on bulk and residential use zoning
set forth as proper considerations in zoning control.
Note, Zoning: Permissible Purposes, 50 COLUM. L. REv. 202, 212 (1950).
25. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
26. Id. at 388.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 395.
29. Lockard v. City of Los Angeles, 33 Cal. 2d 453, 461, 202 P.2d 38, 42 (1949).
See also Town of Los Altos Hills v. Adobe Creek Properties, Inc., 32 Cal. App. 3d 488,
108 Cal. Rptr. 271 (1973); Wilkins v. City of San Bernardino, 29 Cal. 2d 332, 175 P.2d
542 (1946).
30. E.g., Lockard v. City of Los Angeles, 33 Cal. 2d 453, 202 P.2d 38 (1949);
Wilkins v. City of San Bernardino, 29 Cal. 2d 332, 175 P.2d 542 (1946); Morse v.
County of San Luis Obispo, 247 Cal. App. 2d 600, 55 Cal. Rptr. 710 (1967).
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differ," there will be no judicial interference with the mu-
nicipality's determination of policy.'
Thus, as the Supreme Court concluded in Euclid and again in
Zahn v. Board of Public Works, 3 "[i]f the validity . . . be
fairly debatable, the legislative judgment must be allowed to
control. "33
In a few states, this deference to legislative judgment has
been replaced by a more exacting review when an exclusionary
zoning ordinance is challenged. 4 California courts, however,
generally uphold an exclusionary ordinance shown to have a
reasonable relation to the public welfare.3 1
Nevertheless, in a recent case, Associated Home Builders
of the Greater Eastbay, Inc. v. City of Livermore, 3 the Califor-
nia Supreme Court asked, "Whose welfare?" and concluded
that an ordinance must relate to the welfare of those whom it
significantly affects. 3 This view potentially expands the con-
cept of general welfare beyond the traditional limits of a mu-
nicipality's borders. In addition, there is significant dicta injudicial decisions indicating an awareness of the effect that an
exclusionary ordinance can have on the critical housing situa-
tion and on environmental objectives in general. 8 A federal
31. Associated Home Builders of the Greater Eastbay, Inc. v. City of Livermore,
18 Cal. 3d 582, 605, 557 P.2d 473, 486, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41, 54 (1976), citing Clemons v.
City of Los Angeles, 36 Cal. 2d 95, 98, 222 P.2d 439, 441 (1950).
32. 274 U.S. 325 (1927).
33. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926).
34. See, e.g., Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 117 N.J. Super.
11, 283 A.2d 353 (1971) (housing needs encompassed within general welfare; general
welfare does not stop at municipal border); Appeal of Kit-Mar Builders, Inc., 439 Pa.
466, 268 A.2d 765 (1970) (exclusive zoning regulation invalid to unnaturally limit
population growth).
35. E.g., Ybarra v. Town of Los Altos Hills, 503 F.2d 250 (9th Cir. 1974).
36. 18 Cal. 3d 582, 557 P.2d 473, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1976).
37. Id. at 608, 557 P.2d at 488, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 56.
38. While we recognize the ominous possibility that the contribu-
tions required by a city can be deliberately set unreasonably high in order
to prevent the influx of economically depressed persons into the com-
munity, a circumstance which would present serious social and legal
problems, there is nothing to indicate that the enactments of Walnut
Creek in the present case raise such a spectre.
Associated Home Builders of Greater Eastbay, Inc. v. City of Walnut Creek, 4 Cal. 3d
633, 648, 484 P.2d 606, 618, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630, 642 (1971).
[Tihe plan may frustrate some legitimate regional housing needs . . ..
We agree with appellees that unlike the situation in the past most munic-
ipalities today are neither isolated nor wholly independent from neigh-
boring municipalities and that, consequently, unilateral land use deci-
sions by one local entity affect the needs and resources of an entire region.
1979]
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court in Southern Alameda Spanish Speaking Organization v.
Union City"' aptly stated:
Surely, if the environmental benefits of land use plan-
ning are to be enjoyed by a city and the quality of life of
its residents is accordingly to be improved, the poor cannot
be excluded from enjoyment of the benefits. Given the
recognized importance of equal opportunities in housing,
it may well be, as matter of law, that it is the responsibility
of a city and its planning officials to see that the city's plan
as initiated or as it develops accommodates the needs of
its low-income families....4o
Such language reflects the courts' concern for accommo-
dating social needs while pursuing environmental objectives. A
basic underlying question is whether zoning may continue to
be used "to avoid the increased responsibilities and economic
burdens which time and natural growth invariably bring."4' It
is helpful to refer back to the Euclid decision. Although it
validated zoning as a proper municipal use of the police power,
it also contained a strong caveat: "[There is] the possibility
of cases where the general public interest would so far outweigh
the interest of the municipality that the municipality would
not be allowed to stand in the way."
42
In the context of this "possibility," it may be necessary for
municipalities to balance development and preservation inter-
ests to promote the general welfare. In analyzing whether an
exclusionary zoning ordinance is a CEQA "project," a thresh-
old issue is whether municipalities owe responsibilities to those
outside their borders.4 3
Construction Indus. Ass'n, Sonoma City v. City of Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897, 908 (9th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 934 (1976).
39. 424 F.2d 291 (9th Cir. 1970).
40. Id. at 295-96.
41. National Land & Investment Co. v. Kohn, 419 Pa. 504, 528, 215 A.2d 597,
610 (1965). See generally Comment, So You Want to Move to the Suburbs: Policy
Formulation and the Constitutionality of Municipal Growth-Restricting Plans, 3
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 803, 814-18 (1976).
42. 272 U.S. at 390.
43. See generally Comment, The General Public Interest vs. The Presumption
of Zoning Ordinance Validity: A Debatable Question, 50 J. UPB. L. 129 (1972); Com-




THE MUNICIPAL AFFAIRS DOCTRINE-RECOGNITION OF EXTERNAL
EFFECTS
The doctrine of municipal affairs stems from constitu-
tional provisions" that enable charter cities to "control their
own affairs to the fullest possible extent. . .. -. The primary
purpose of the doctrine is to prevent state legislative interfer-
ence with matters that are considered to be strictly the munici-
pal affairs of charter cities." If a state legislates on a matter
determined to be a municipal affair, local law will control.47 On
the other hand, a state regulation on a matter determined to
be of statewide concern will prevail over local regulation in the
event of a conflict. 48
There are judicially developed factors that determine
whether a matter is a municipal affair or one that is of state-
wide concern. These factors are important to show why exclu-
sionary zoning should be considered a "project" subject to
CEQA requirements. The issue of whether exclusionary zoning
is a matter of statewide concern is not determinative of its
qualification as a "project" under CEQA. However, the factors
that support its treatment as such suggest that it is more than
purely a municipal affair.
Local Projects with External Effect-Not a Municipal Affair
Courts have generally considered the adoption of a zoning
ordinance or a general plan to be a municipal affair. 4 However,
they have not yet decided whether a zoning ordinance which
has an external effect outside an acting municipality's borders
should remain a municipal affair. Cases that held that a mu-
nicipal project extending beyond a city's borders is not a mu-
nicipal affair lend support to the proposition that a zoning
44. The derivation of the doctrine is from CAL. CONST. art. XI, which provides:
It shall be competent in any city charter to provide that the city governed
thereunder may make and enforce all ordinances and regulations in re-
spect to municipal affairs, subject only to restrictions and limitations
provided in their several charters and in respect to other matters they
shall be subject to general laws.
45. Fragley v. Phelan, 126 Cal. 383, 387, 58 P. 923, 925 (1899).
46. See The Municipal Affairs Doctrine, supra note 22, at 434-36.
47. Bishop v. City of San Jose, 1 Cal. 3d 56, 61, 460 P.2d 137, 140, 81 Cal. Rptr.
465, 468 (1969).
48. Professional Fire Fighters, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 60 Cal. 2d 276, 292
nill, 384 P.2d 158, 168 n.ll, 32 Cal. Rptr. 830, 840 n.ll (1963).
49. E.g., Brougher v. Board of Public Works, 205 Cal. 426, 271 P. 487 (1928).
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ordinance shown to have an external effect should similarly be
considered.
Two early California cases dealing with municipal projects
reflect the acceptance by courts of the contention that local
activities which affect inhabitants outside an acting city's bor-
ders are not municipal affairs over which a municipality may
exercise exclusive control.
In Gadd v. McGuire,5" the court upheld the constitution-
ality of the City Boundary Line Act, which authorized the con-
struction of sewers and drainage systems along streets that
form or intersect municipal boundaries. 5 Concluding that the
ordinance did not deal with a municipal affair, the court ex-
plained that municipal improvements may "become affairs of
a broader scope which cannot be handled adequately by the
municipal authorities of a single city or town for the reason that
they . . .affect the inhabitants . . .of two or more cities
'52
The court restricted municipal affairs to projects that are
contained exclusively within a city's borders and which do not
affect outside residents.53 It implied that local regulations are
too narrow in scope to deal adequately with a matter that is of
concern to two or more cities and that enforcement of a local
ordinance in such a situation would interfere with the interests
of a neighboring city. What would ordinarily be a municipal
affair became a matter of broader concern by virtue of its exter-
nal impact. Consequently, the court held that it was not a
matter for exclusive municipal control.
A similar conclusion was reached in City of Pasadena v.
Chamberlain,54 in which the court upheld the constitutionality
of the Metropolitan Water District Act.55 The court held that
because the subject matter of the Act transcended municipal
borders, it was not a municipal affair.5" The court pointed out
that the proper allocation of water required cities to act collec-
tively. 7 The implication was that cities would be ineffective
acting alone.
50. 69 Cal. App. 347, 231 P. 754 (1924).
51. Id. at 351, 231 P. at 756.
52. Id. at 357, 231 P. at 759.
53. Id. at 355, 231 P. at 757.
54. 204 Cal. 653, 269 P. 630 (1928).





Both Gadd and Chamberlain illustrate that a court will
determine what constitutes a municipal affair based on the
scope of a matter, its effect on outside interests, and whether
it can be handled effectively on a local level. Though both cases
differ factually from a situation involving a zoning ordinance,
they support the idea that the same considerations of scope,
effect, and local resolution would be appropriate in determin-
ing whether the subject of a zoning ordinance is one for exclu-
sive local control.
In a more recent case, the court relied heavily on the gen-
eral public interest in a utility in determining that it was not
a municipal affair. The court in Pacific Telephone and Tele-
graph Company v. City and County of San Francisco"5 rejected
a city's contention that it had exclusive control over the con-
struction and maintenance of telephone lines within the city.58
The court held that the matter was one of statewide concern
due, in part, to the scope of the matter (the state's telephone
communication system) and the possible effect of the city's
action outside its borders.10 In contrast with Gadd and
Chamberlain, there was no evidence of foreseeable effect,
merely the possibility that exclusive control by the city would
interfere with the state's telephone network. Nevertheless, the
court was persuaded to rule against the city because of "the
interest of the people throughout the state in the existence of
telephone lines in the streets in the city ..
Apparently, statewide public interest in the integrity of a
statewide communication system outweighed any municipal
interest in exclusive control over telephone construction within
city limits. The implication with respect to exclusionary zoning
is that statewide concern in providing low-moderate cost hous-
ing may outweigh a municipal interest in exercising exclusive
control over all land-use decisions within its borders. If the
external effect of exclusionary zoning were substantiated by
evidence, then it should weigh at least as heavily as did the
speculative effect of exclusive municipal control in Pacific
Telephone.
58. 51 Cal. 2d 766, 336 P.2d 514 (1959).
59. Id. at 773, 336 P.2d at 518.
60. If the telephone lines were removed from the streets in the city,
the people throughout the state, the United States, and most parts of the
world who can now communicate directly by telephone with residents in
the city could no longer do so.
Id.
61. Id. at 774, 336 P.2d at 519.
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External Effect-New Significance in an Environmental
Context
It follows from Gadd, Chamberlain, and Pacific Telephone
that the recognition of general interest beyond a municipality's
borders may be determinative of whether a matter is of state-
wide concern. Courts have shown that where there is a recog-
nized general interest in land-use decisions that affect an entire
region, the powers of planning and zoning likewise cease to be
purely local in nature or in purpose.
This point was illustrated in Younger v. El Dorado
County."2 In that case, certain counties refused to contribute
their share of funds to the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 3
contending that the Agency's powers to formulate and enforce
a regional plan violated their constitutional grant of power over
local affairs.6' The court upheld the constitutionality of the
Agency's powers based on the conclusion that the subject mat-
ter was of regional, rather than local, concern. 5 The court em-
phasized that "[tihe unique scenic attributes which the
Agency must preserve are enjoyed not only by the residents of
the region but also by large numbers of the state's general
citizenry."" The Agency's role was even recognized as a matter
of concern not only to California, but also "to its neighbors and,
indeed, to the entire country." 7
In Younger, the broad interest in a particular scenic region
of the state transformed a traditionally municipal affair (plan-
ning and zoning) into a matter of statewide concern. The trans-
formation required a broad perspective. In particular, the court
emphasized the need to respond to changing conditions and to
adjust methods and concepts accordingly:
[P]roblems which exhibit exclusively local characteristics
at certain times in the life of a community, acquire larger
dimensions and changed characteristics at others. "It is
• ..settled that the constitutional concept of municipal
affairs is not a fixed or static quantity. It changes with the
62. 5 Cal. 3d 480, 487 P.2d 1193, 96 Cal. Rptr. 553 (1971).
63. The Planning Agency was organized pursuant to the Tahoe Regional Com-
pact. The Compact was formed between California and Nevada. It gives the Planning
Agency jurisdiction over the Tahoe region to formulate and enforce a regional plan.
See CAL. Gov'T CODE § 66801 (West Supp. 1978).
64. 5 Cal. 3d at 492, 487 P.2d at 1199-1200, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 559-60.
65. Id. at 494, 487 P.2d at 1201, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 561.
66. Id. at 491-92, 487 P.2d at 1199, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 559.
67. Id. at 485, 487 P.2d at 1194, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 554.
[Vol. 19
EXCLUSIONARY ZONING
changing conditions upon which it is to operate."
[Citations omitted]. When the effects of change are felt
beyond the point of its immediate impact, it is fatuous to
expect that controlling such change remains a local prob-
lem to be solved by local methods. Old attitudes confer no
irrevocable license to continue looking with unseeing
eyes.18
In Younger, "to continue looking with unseeing eyes" was to
ignore the larger dimensions of land-use decisions in the Tahoe
region and to avoid control of the effects of local action on the
area's environment.
The effects of local activity took on even broader dimen-
sions in CEEED v. California Coastal Zone Conservation
Commission." There, the court held that the Coastal Conserva-
tion Act of 1972 did not constitute an invalid intrusion into the
municipal affairs of charter cities. 0 It placed the matter of local
activity in the broad context of environmental protection by
stating:
Although planning and zoning in the conventional sense
have traditionally been deemed municipal affairs, where
the ecological and environmental impact of land use affect
the people of the entire state, they can no longer remain
matters of purely local concern."
The courts in Younger and CEEED discussed the munici-
pal affairs doctrine with respect to the constitutionality of pow-
ers granted to a regional agency. In both cases, the issue of
municipal affairs became collateral to the broader question of
resource allocation or how best "to control land use which
threatens harm to the state's resources . "7... 2
While the doctrine of municipal affairs remains a valid
concept, the factors which are determinative in a conflict be-
tween state and local control are also significant in the context
of environmental issues. Given the judicial recognition of the
external effect that a local activity may have, there is a need
to examine the effects of exclusionary zoning in the broader
context of resource allocation. There is a similar need to bal-
ance municipal interests with broader concerns in the housing
68. Id. at 497-98, 487 P.2d at 1204, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 564.
69. 43 Cal. App. 3d 306, 118 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1974).
70. Id. at 324, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 328.
71. Id. at 323, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 327.
72. Id. at 319, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 325.
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situation, and to evaluate the impact of exclusionary practices
by one municipality on the region as a whole. An approach that
provides a means of achieving this examination is to consider
an exclusionary zoning ordinance a "project" under the Cali-
fornia Environmental Quality Act.
Is EXCLUSIONARY ZONING A "PROJECT" SUBJECT TO CEQA
REQUIREMENTS?
CEQA-An Introduction
The California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) 3 con-
tains a broad expression of legislative policy which places prior-
ity on the "maintenance of a quality environment" 4 in con-
junction with "the general welfare of the people of the state,
including their enjoyment of the [state's] natural resources
... ,, These priorities are emphasized in one of the stated
purposes of the Act: "[To c]reate and maintain conditions
under which man and nature can exist in productive harmony
to fulfill the social and economic requirements of present and
future generations. '"76 It is clear from this general purpose that
environmental protection is not an exclusive goal of the Act.
Rather, the intent is to promote "a reordering of priorities, so
that environmental costs and benefits will assume their proper
place along with other considerations.""
The key procedural tool with which the Act's policies are
implemented is the Environmental Impact Report (EIR). 5 The
73. CAL. Pun. RES. CODE §§ 21000-21176 (West 1977 & Supp. 1978). See generally
Comment, Aftermath: Friends of Mammoth and the Amended California Environ-
mental Quality Act, 3 ECOLOGY L.Q. 349 (1973).
74. CAL. PUB. Ras. CODE § 21000(a) (West 1977).
75. Id. § 21000(c).
76. Id. § 21000(e).
77. Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971)
(Skelly Wright, J., interpreting NEPA policy). CEQA is patterned after the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4367
(1976). California courts often rely on federal cases interpreting NEPA for guidance in
CEQA interpretation. No Oil, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 13 Cal. 3d 68, 529 P.2d 66,
118 Cal. Rptr. 34 (1975); Friends of Mammoth v. Board of Supervisors, 8 Cal. 3d 247,
260-61, 502 P.2d 1049, 1057, 104 Cal. Rptr. 761, 769 (1972).
78. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21061 (West 1977). "In many respects the EIR is the
heart of CEQA. The report. . . may be viewed as an environmental 'alarm bell' whose
purpose it is to alert the public and its responsible officials to environments changes
before they have reached ecological points of no return." County of Inyo v. Yorty, 32
Cal. App. 3d 795, 810, 108 Cal. Rptr. 377, 388 (1973). For a thorough treatment on
information that should be included in an EIR, see Hildreth, Environmental Impact
Reports under the California Environmental Quality Act: The New Legal Framework,
17 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 805 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Hildreth].
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function of the EIR is to serve as an informational document.7 9
It is "prepared using a systematic, interdisciplinary ap-
proach." 0 Its purposes are: "[T]o identify the significant ef-
fects of a project on the environment, to identify alternatives
to the project, and to indicate the manner in which such signifi-
cant effects can be mitigated or avoided."'" The emphasis of
the preparation of the EIR should be on mitigation measures
and project alternatives, including the alternative of no project
at all. 2
Exclusionary Zoning as a "Project" under CEQA and the
Guidelines
CEQA requires that public agencies "shall prepare, or
cause to be prepared . . . an environmental impact report on
any project they propose to carry out or approve which may
have a significant effect on the environment. '8 3 The question
arises whether exclusionary zoning constitutes a "project"
under both CEQA and the guidelines issued in 1973 by the
Secretary of the Resources Agency. 8'
Section 21065 of CEQA defines "project" in terms so broad
as to include even activities that have no effect on the environ-
ment.85 Relevant parts provide that "project" means:
(a) Activities directly undertaken by any public
agency....
(c) Activities involving the issuance to a person of a
lease, permit, license, certificate, or other entitlement for
use by one or more public agencies."8
Under these broad terms, exclusionary zoning qualifies as
a "project." It is clearly an activity undertaken by a public
79. See CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 14, § 15012 (1977); CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21061
(West 1977).
80. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 14, § 15140(d) (1977).
81. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21002.1(a) (West 1978).
82. See CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21003(c) (West 1977); CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 14, §
15143(d) (1977).
83. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21151 (West 1977).
84. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 14, §§ 15000-15192 (1977) (issued pursuant to CAL. PUB.
RES. CODE § 21083. It has been suggested that California has a three-tier system-the
Act, the guidelines, and local regulations that must conform to the first two. See
Seneker, The Legislative Response to Friends of Mammoth: Developers Chase the
Will-o-the- Wisp, 48 CAL. ST. B.J. 127 (1973).
85. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21065 (West 1977).
86. Id. § 21065(a), (c).
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agency, and it involves the issuance of "entitlement for use"
each time a permit is granted in accordance with the terms of
a zoning ordinance.
Although "project" is defined broadly, CEQA narrows the
range of projects to which the Act applies. Nevertheless,
"discretionary projects," such as the enactment or amendment
of zoning ordinances, are included in the scope of application.87
The definition of "project" in the guidelines is also sufficiently
broad to include exclusionary zoning ordinances. According to
the guidelines, "project" refers to:
[T]he whole of an action, which has a potential for result-
ing in a physical change in the environment directly or
ultimately, that is any of the following: ...enactment
and amendment of zoning ordinances and the adoption
and amendment of local General Plans or elements there-
of .... 88
Subdivision (c) of that provision serves to emphasize "the
whole of an action" by stating that "project" refers to the
underlying activity."9 This is an important consideration in de-
termining the applicability of CEQA to procedural processes
such as the enactment or amendment of a zoning ordinance.
It may be argued that the continued enforcement of a zon-
ing ordinance is not an activity, but merely the continuation
of a prior decision-a nonactivity, in a sense. However, the fact
that the enactment of an ordinance constitutes a "project"
under CEQA supports the idea that enforcement or repeated
approval of the ordinance does also.
The issue is partially covered in section 15070 of the guide-
lines, which discusses "ongoing projects."90 The relevant sec-
tion provides as follows:
(a) A project covered by Section 15037(a)(1) definition of
project specified by these Guidelines, approved prior to
November 23, 1970, shall not require an Environmental
Impact Report . . .unless it is a project which may have
a significant effect on the environment ... .
87. Id. § 21080 (West Supp. 1978).
88. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 14, § 15037(a)(1) (1977).
89. Id. § 15037(c). "The term 'project' refers to the activity which is being ap-
proved and which may be subject to several discretionary approvals by governmental
agencies." Id.
90. Id. § 15070.
91. Id. (emphasis added).
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It appears safe to conclude from this section that the tech-
nical nature of an activity-whether it is the enactment of a
zoning ordinance as opposed to its continued enforcement-is
not the critical issue in determining whether there must be
CEQA compliance. Rather, the issue is whether an activity
"may have a significant effect on the environment." 2
The continued enforcement of exclusionary zoning quali-
fies as an ongoing project having a significant environmental
effect. Since exclusionary zoning may have an impact on neigh-
boring communities 3 contending with a serious housing shor-
tage, it is reasonable to expect the continued enforcement of an
exclusionary ordinance to have a significant regional impact on
land use, and thus, on the environment." Recent case law lendsjudicial support to this statutory analysis.
Judicial Interpretation
Judicial decisions are important sources of information in
interpreting CEQA requirements. 5 They are a vital supple-
ment to the language of the guidelines. The court in County of
Inyo v. Yorty, 11 for example, clarifies the factors determinative
of whether an ongoing project must comply with CEQA. The
court was faced with the specific issue of whether an "ongoing
project," the structural part of which had been completed prior
to the enactment of CEQA, was nevertheless subject to CEQA
requirements. 7
Yorty involved the City of Los Angeles and its controver-
sial water project in the Owens Valley. Inyo County, where the
valley is located, sought injunctive restraints on the extraction
92. County of Inyo v. Yorty, 32 Cal. App. 3d 795, 806, 108 Cal. Rptr. 377, 385
(1973).
93. "The Legislature finds and declares that . . . there exists within the urban
and rural areas of the state a serious shortage of decent, safe, and sanitary housing
which persons and families of low or moderate income, including the elderly and
handicapped, can afford." CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 50003 (West Supp. 1978).
94. See A. JOKELA, SELF REGULATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY (1975). But cf.
Aloi, Recent Developments in Exclusionary Zoning: The Second Generation Cases and
the Environment, 6 Sw. U. L. REv. 88 (1974) (preservation of environmental values
may result in exclusion of certain income and racial groups from acting communities);
Ackerman, Impact Statements and Low Cost Housing, 46 S. CAL. L. REv. 754 (1973)
(impact statements could lead to ad hoc planning, exclusion of low-cost housing,
increased costs).
95. See Hildreth, supra note 78, at 806.
96. 32 Cal. App. 3d 795, 408 Cal. Rptr. 377 (1973).
97. Id. at 802, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 382.
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of groundwater for export from the valley.9" It also sought a
mandatory injuction requiring the City of Los Angeles to file
one or more environmental impact reports.9
The city contended that the extraction and exportation of
groundwater was an inherent part of its second aqueduct, a
project that had been completed prior to the enactment of
CEQA.'00 The city argued that, as such, its groundwater extrac-
tion program was not subject to CEQA requirements.'"'
The court rejected the city's argument. It noted that the
ecological impact on the second aqueduct, in terms of the con-
tinued increase in amount of groundwater extraction, was of
such mounting severity as to fall within the policy concerns of
CEQA.'°2 The court concluded that the extraction of groundwa-
ter for exportation through the aqueduct constituted a second
project within the scope of the Act.'10 It issued a writ of man-
date directing Los Angeles and its Department of Water and
Power to file an environmental impact report on the extraction
of groundwater from the valley despite the inception of the
project before the enactment of CEQA. 104
The court's broad interpretation of the term "project" is
significant in its focus on the environmental impact of an activ-
ity rather than on a functional definition. Under this interpre-
tation, a "project" may be that part of an original activity that
continues to have an impact on the environment. This is an
important distinction in the case of exclusionary zoning ordi-
nances that have increasing impact in view of rapid population
growth and a critical housing shortage.
The court determined that the ongoing project required an
EIR based on "substantial evidence" that continuance of the
subsurface extraction might have a significant effect on the
environment. 0 5 This use of evidence illustrates the lack of a
standard to determine when an ongoing project requires an
EIR. The decision was based on the particular facts of the
case.'08 Nevertheless, the court in Inyo emphasized in its ad hoc




102. Id. at 806, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 385.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 815-16, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 391.
105. Id. at 809, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 387.
106. This is similar to the ad hoc determination of whether a matter has such
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decision that "the highest priority shall be given to environ-
mental considerations."'' 0°
Major judicial decisions consistently reinforce this prior-
ity. As a result, courts require minimal evidence to establish
that a project may have a significant environmental effect. For
example, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in City of Davis
v. Coleman'°5 explained that the "significant effect" test is met
when a plaintiff "allege[s] facts which, if true, show that the
proposed project would materially degrade any aspect of envi-
ronmental quality."'' 0
Placing the same priority on environmental considera-
tions, the California Supreme Court in No Oil, Inc. v. City of
Los Angeles"' significantly expanded the applicability of
CEQA by adding that "the existence of serious public contro-
versy concerning the environmental effect of a project in itself
indicates that preparation of an EIR is desirable.""'
The requirement of an EIR in situations of controversy is
also covered in the guidelines. Section 15081 provides:
[W]here there is, or anticipated to be, a substantial body
of opinion that considers or will consider the effect [of the
project] to be adverse, the lead agency should prepare an
EIR to explore the environmental effects involved. 12
The No Oil decision and the guidelines strongly indicate
that the mere anticipation of debate over whether a project
may have a significant effect is sufficient grounds to require an
EIR. The requirement is reasonable in light of the fact that the
EIR is to serve as "an informational document." If the top
priority is to "afford the fullest possible protection to the envi-
ronment," then the requirement of an EIR to provide factual
certainty in a debatable issue is a necessary safeguard."'
Based on judicial interpretation of CEQA requirements
and on the guidelines, it is reasonable to treat exclusionary
an external effect as not to constitute a municipal affair. See CEEED v. California
Coastal Zone Conservation Comm'n, 43 Cal. App. 3d 306, 320-21, 118 Cal. Rptr. 315,
325-26 (1974).
107. 32 Cal. App. 3d at 804, 108 Cal. Rptr. 384.
108. 521 F.2d 661 (9th Cir. 1975).
109. Id. at 673.
110. 13 Cal. 3d 68, 529 P.2d 66, 118 Cal. Rptr. 34 (1975).
111. Id. at 85-86, 529 P.2d at 78, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 46.
112. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 14, § 15081(a) (1977).
113. Friends of Mammoth v. Board of Supervisors, 8 Cal. 3d at 259, 502 P.2d at
1056, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 768.
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zoning as an ongoing project which may have a significant
effect on the environment. The attendant controversy over the
effect of land-use decisions on surrounding cities, on popula-
tion density, or on the housing market is adequate reason to
require that continued enforcement of exclusionary zoning or-
dinances be the subject of an EIR.
The Significance of Applying CEQA to Exclusionary Zoning
One of the results of applying the EIR requirement to ex-
clusionary zoning would be the inclusion of a regional perspec-
tive in a municipality's decision. Section 15142 of the guide-
lines stresses that an EIR describe the environment around the
project "from both a local and regional perspective.""' An im-
portant part of this description must include "related projects"
in the region "for purposes of examining the possible cumula-
tive impact of such projects.""' In the context of exclusionary
zoning, this might entail the description of municipal ordi-
nances throughout the region and the cumulative impact of
them on the allocation of regional resources.
The importance of a regional perspective was alluded to by
the court in Environmental Defense Fund v. Coastside County
Water District."' The case was the first to decide that the
courts may review the sufficiency of an EIR. In reaching its
decision, the court pointed out that "[those who prepare the
EIR may not limit their vision by the boundaries of the district,
nor by purely physical auxiliaries or obstacles to a project's
success which may be found beyond the borders.""' 7
The court also strongly implied that social as well as
purely environmental ramifications be discussed in the EIR
stating that: "[T]he preparation of the EIR demands thought-
ful consideration of public interests transcending such neces-
114. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 14, § 15142 (1977). For a discussion on regional
perspective, see generally Comment, The General Public Interest vs. the Presumption
of Zoning Ordinance Validity: A Debatable Question, 50 J. URB. L. 129 (1972); Com-
ment, Zoning-Municipal Corporations-General Welfare as a Zoning Purpose Held
to Encompass Local and Regional Housing Needs, 26 RutroEs L. REv. 401 (1973);
Comment, So. Burlington Co. NAACP v. Township of Mt. Laurel: Municipalities
Must Zone to Provide a Fair Share of Regional Housing Needs, 5 N.Y.U. REv. L. &
Soc'y (1975); Comment, A Regional Perspective of the "General Welfare," 14 SAN
DIEGO L. REv. 1227 (1977).
115. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 14, § 15142 (1977).
116. 27 Cal. App. 3d 695, 104 Cal. Rptr. 197 (1972).
117. Id. at 704, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 202.
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sary elements as always have been present, e.g., engineering
and economic feasibility.""' 8 It is unclear to what extent social
information should be included in an EIR. CEQA and the
guidelines both support the inclusion of such information. Both
recognize any "adverse effects on human beings" as one of the
criteria by which to determine whether a project may have a
significant environmental effect."'
Where an exclusionary zoning ordinance is the subject of
a report, it would be helpful to neighboring cities to include
information on social effects. This information would help
them determine the exclusionary project's impact on the area's
quality of life, probably one of their major concerns.
CEQA would provide a conceptual, as well as legal frame-
work in which to consider the environmental effects of an ex-
clusionary ordinance. Although the Act defines "environment"
in terms of physical conditions,120 the concept quickly assumes
much broader social ramifications when the criteria for
"significant effect" are considered.
An EIR on exclusionary zoning, prepared according to the
above directives, would be not only an "informational docu-
ment," but also a strong commentary on the validity of an
exclusionary ordinance. This follows from the statement in
Livermore that an ordinance, to be valid, must "reasonably
relate to the welfare of those whom it significantly affects."''
A properly prepared EIR would attest to the reasonableness of
an ordinance in light of its external impact.
In short, subjecting exclusionary zoning to CEQA require-
ments would not only force a city to consider environmental
effects within its own borders, but would also compel it to make
decisions with regional environmental consequences in mind.
This function of an EIR would compliment the judicial deci-
sion in Scott v. City of Indian Wells 2' and also de-emphasize
the traditional concept of zoning as a purely municipal affair.
In Scott, the controversy stemmed from the issuance of a
conditional use permit by a city to allow major development on
land just within its borders. Property owners on the other side
118. Id.
119. CAL. PuB. RES. CODE § 21083(c) (West 1977) (repeated in CAL. ADMIN. CODE
tit. 14, § 15082(d) (1977)).
120. See CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21060.5 (West 1977).
121. 18 Cal. 3d 582, 607, 557 P.2d 473, 487, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41, 55 (1976).
122. 6 Cal. 3d 541, 492 P.2d 1137, 99 Cal. Rptr. 745 (1972).
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of the border brought an action to void the city's grant of per-
mit, claiming that the planned development would destroy
their view.' = The court rejected the city's claim that its ordi-
nances applied only to areas within its borders. l 4 The court
held that nonresident adjacent property owners have standing
to challenge zoning decisions adverse to their property inter-
ests.'2 The court also concluded that the city had a duty to give
notice to all affected landowners and to consider their views
and the effect of the proposed zoning ordinance on their prop-
erty.126
Although the court's decision applied specifically to adja-
cent nonresident landowners, the court recognized in dictum
that "local zoning may have even a regional impact.' '27 Thus,
there was an implication that an acting municipality may have
a duty to consider the effects of a land-use decision on an entire
region.
One of the major functions of the EIR is to inform govern-
mental agencies and the public in general about a project's
environmental impact. 28 Part of the procedure in filing a report
is to invite public participation in the decision-making process.
Preparation of an EIR by an acting municipality would not
only alert neighboring cities to the potential external effects of
a particular land-use decision; it might also serve to substanti-
ate their claims that a city was acting adversely to their inter-
ests. Thus, other municipalities in the same region would be
entitled to comment on a municipality's EIR with respect to
an exclusionary zoning ordinance and to have their comments
considered during the review process.
2 9
Application of CEQA to exclusionary zoning would legal-
ize the decision-making process. The court in County of Inyo
v. City of Los Angeles' " alluded to this aspect when it reviewed
the city's EIR, filed pursuant to a 1973 writ of mandate.' Inyo
County objected to the report's sufficiency and the court sus-
123. Id. at 545, 492 P.2d at 1139, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 747.
124. Id. at 548, 492 P.2d at 1141, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 749.
125. Id. at 549, 492 P.2d at 1142, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 750.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 548, 492 P.2d at 1141, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 749.
128. Bozung v. LAFCO, 13 Cal. 3d 263, 285, 529 P.2d 1017, 1032, 118 Cal. Rptr.
249, 264 (1975).
129. See City of Davis v. Coleman, 521 F.2d 661, 672 (9th Cir. 1975).
130. 71 Cal. App. 3d 185, 139 Cal. Rptr. 396 (1977).




tained the objection. The court noted that the EIR recom-
mended proposals for large-scale projects for the entire aque-
duct program.'32 These proposals, adopted in a resolution by
the Los Angeles Board of Water and Power Commissioners,
went far beyond the project description in the EIR. The court
concluded that the modest EIR description in the initial pro-
ject provided a questionable basis for the broad proposals. As
a result, the report was held to be legally insufficient.' 3
Although the court confined its decision to whether or not
the EIR complied with CEQA, it cast doubt on the legality of
the Board's approval of the large proposals. The court stated
in dicta that "a legally sufficient EIR is a precondition to legal-
ity of the public agency's approval resolution .... ,,131 By
strong implication, the court interpreted the EIR requirement
to be a necessary step in an agency's decision-making process.
The significance of this interpretation, especially with re-
spect to land-use planning, is in the establishment of proce-
dures that require full disclosure of the factors that shape an
agency's final decision. The enforcement of such a system
through active judicial review of the sufficiency of the EIR (as
in the Inyo case) would limit parochial decision-making. In
addition, the decision itself, to be a valid exercise of power and
thus, to be legally binding, would be conditioned upon suffi-
cient compliance with CEQA.
CONCLUSION
Rapid population growth and a critical housing situation
create demands on natural resources. The challenge facing
many municipalities today is how best to accommodate social
and economic demands while pursuing environmental goals.
The answer does not lie in exclusionary zoning, for the environ-
mental benefits it may bring to one community translate into
increased population density and attendant problems for oth-
ers.
Since cities form an interdependent regional complex, it is
reasonable that they infuse a regional perspective into their
land-use policies. One of the ways to achieve this is to subject
132. County of Inyo v. City of Los Angeles, 71 Cal. App. 3d 185, 190, 139 Cal.
Rptr. 396, 400 (1977).
133. Id. at 200, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 406. The court also held that the EIR failed to
describe all reasonable alternatives to the project. Id. at 203, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 408.
134. 71 Cal. App. 3d at 204, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 408.
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their land-use decisions to the requirements of CEQA, espe-
cially where the policies of one community have an impact on
another. It is hoped that the result would be to replace unilat-
eral exclusion with regional harmony.
Arlene Ichien
